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PAC's: CONGRESS ON THE AUCTION BLOCK
Lawtont ChiWes*
INTRODUCTION
Jesse Unruh, a veteran California politician, once observed that
money is "the mother's milk of politics."' Throughout the history of
the American political process money has often been the key to electo-
ral success. The well-financed campaign is frequently the successful
campaign.
An important chapter in the development of American democracy
involves the use of campaign money-how it is obtained and how at-
tempts have been made to limit its influence. This development has
involved the balancing of a candidate's funding needs with the neces-
sity of maintaining the integrity of the electoral system. Just as candi-
dates always need money, there are always people ready to channel
funds to campaigns through various means. When the amount contrib-
uted or the means of contribution threaten to undermine the integrity
of the electoral process, reform becomes necessary.
This article will examine the rise and proliferation of political ac-
tion committees (PAC's) as a means of contributing to and attempting
to influence federal election campaigns. First, it will trace the historical
development of PAC's. Second, it will review legislative efforts to con-
trol the activities of PAC's and the challenges to these legislative efforts
in the United States Supreme Court. Third, it will examine the impact
of PAC's on the representative process. Fourth, it will analyze pending
legislative initiatives to curb the influence of PAC's. Last, it will pro-
pose the formation of a bipartisan commission to develop concrete leg-
islative recommendations to deal with the PAC problem.
BACKGROUND
In the nineteenth century, campaign funds were exacted from polit-
ically-appointed federal employees. This practice was ended by the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1883.2 The flow of millions of corporate
dollars into Presidential campaigns resulted in enactment of the Till-
man Act of 1907, which prohibited direct corporate contributions.
* Member, United States Senate, D-Fla.; B.S., University of Florida, 1952; LL.B., University
of Florida College of Law, 1955.
1. Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1004 (1976)
(statement of Jesse Unruh, Former Speaker of the California Assembly and presently Cali-
fornia State Treasurer).
2. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
3. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
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Similarly, the explosion in political spending by labor unions in the
1930's culminated in the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, which pro-
hibited political contributions by labor unions. 4 More recently, the es-
timated $30 million contributed legally and illegally to the Nixon
Presidential campaign5 provided the impetus for the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.6 This Act imposed overall limi-
tations on campaign contributions and expenditures, provided for pub-
lic funding of Presidential election campaigns, and established the
Federal Election Commission (FEC).7
Today, the focus of debate has shifted away from Presidential poli-
tics. With the advent of public financing of Presidential campaigns,8
Congress has become the target of large sums of campaign money. 9 In
recent years, drastic changes have occurred in the financing of congres-
sional elections. Tremendous sums of money have been raised and
spent. In 1982, United States House of Representative and Senate can-
didates spent $343 million campaigning for office, an increase of nearly
five hundred percent over 1974 expenditures.' 0 The expensive technol-
ogy of today's campaigns multiplies the political impact of money and
underscores the political consequences of conducting a campaign with
insufficient funds. " Thus, multi-million-dollar Senate campaigns leave
candidates with little option other than the unstinting pursuit of cam-
paign contributions.
Paralleling the growth in congressional campaign spending, and
certainly adding to it, is the increasing dominance of political action
committees in supplying campaign funds. PAC's have swelled in num-
bers and influence. In 1974, 608 PAC's existed. 12 By 1983, the number
had grown to 3,37 1.' The level of PAC contributions to candidates for
federal office rose from $8.5 million in 1972 to over $83.1 million in
1982.1' PAC's are fast becoming the backbone of congressional cam-
paign financing. If the current trend continues, they will soon be the
major source of congressional campaign funds. In 1982, PAC contribu-
4. Pub. L. No. 89, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943), repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
862.
5. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM
140-42 (3d ed. 1984).
6. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
7. Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 103, 201, 88 Stat. 1263, 1272-75 (1974) (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 441a-b (1982)).
8. See FENN, MONEY AND POLITICS: CAMPAIGN SPENDING OUT OF CONTROL 1 (1983) (mono-
graph prepared for Center for Responsive Politics).
9. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLU-
TION AND GROWTH AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 55 (1982) (pre-
pared by Joseph E. Cantor) (hereinafter cited as PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH]. See also
Contribution Limitations and Independent Expenditures- Hearings Before the Task Force on
Elections of the House Comm. on House Administration, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 287 (1982).
10. See FENN, supra note 8, at 1, 6.
11. Id. at 1.





tions already represented 31.5% of the campaign funds spent by win-
ning House and Senate candidates.'"
In a very short time and in a seemingly happen-stance fashion,
PAC's have emerged as a major factor in the electoral process. This
phenomenon raises significant questions relating to both the electoral
and the legislative processes. Can a candidate fund a congressional
campaign without soliciting PAC contributions? Are PAC's a way for
like-minded citizens to maximize their impact on the political process
or, rather, are they a means of political influence for corporations and
labor unions which are prohibited by law from contributing directly to
federal campaigns? Are PAC's inimical to the concept of individual
participation and political equality? In the public perception, is a Con-
gress elected with PAC money a Congress that answers to the special
rather than the public interest? Is there a quidpro quo with congres-
sional issues being decided on the basis of PAC contributions? These
questions strike at the very heart of representative democracy, in which
one person's vote is supposed to equal the next person's vote. PAC's
raise the prospect that the integrity of the political process itself may be
compromised.
In little more than a decade, political action committees have risen
from a minor, almost inconsequential factor in American politics to
such stature as to raise concerns that the individual citizen is being ex-
cluded from the political process. Congress has been characterized as
being bought and sold by PAC contributions. The Wall Street Journal
described the 98th Congress as follows:
The new Congress is a scandal waiting to happen. It's a scandal be-
cause seldom has a Congress assembled that is so blatantly beholden to
interest groups pushing for special legislative favors. And you can be
sure that many of those favors will be granted.
For, quite legally, an array of special interest groups, both business and
labor, has bought enormous influence in Congress through the cam-
paign contributions of their political action groups. 16
Many members of Congress and political commentators have ques-
tioned how PAC's emerged as such a significant political force, the im-
plications of their continued growth, and whether steps should be taken
to limit their influence.
LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS
CONTRIBUTING TO PAC DEVELOPMENT
The Emergence of Political Action Committees
Political action committees emerged in the 1940's as a response by
15. See Federal Election Commission, FEC Releases Data on 1982-82 Congressional Spending
(press release) (May 2, 1983).
16. Jackson, The Problem with PACs. Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1982, at 30, col. 4.
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organized labor 7 to the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943."8 That Act,
commonly known as the Smith-Connelly Act, prohibited labor organi-
zations from contributing to the campaigns of candidates for federal
office. 9 In 1947, after the Smith-Connelly Act expired, the Labor
Management Relations Acts commonly known as the Taft-Hartley
Act2° was signed into law. The Taft-Hartley Act banned contributions
to federal election campaigns by corporations, national banks, and la-
bor organizations.21 In addition, the Act extended the contribution
prohibition to include primaries as well as general elections.22 Until
the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,23 the Taft-
Hartley Act stood as the principal law governing the political activities
of corporations and labor unions.
In an attempt to minimize the impact of the Smith-Connelly restric-
tions, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)24 created the
Congress of Industrial Organizations Political Action Committee
(CIO-PAC) in July, 1943.25 In so doing, the CIO pioneered the use of a
separate, segregated fund as a means of circumventing the campaign
contribution restrictions placed on organized labor and corporations by
Federal law.26
Initially, the CIO-PAC gathered donations for political activities
from union affiliates, 27 with much of the money coming from dues col-
lected at the local level. 28 However, after the nominating conventions
of 1944, the CIO-PAC turned to a new form of fundraising. It began to
solicit voluntary contributions from union members through its "A
Buck for Roosevelt Drive."29 The union also established the National
Citizens for Political Action Committee (NC-PAC) to collect funds
from individuals outside of labor's ranks who were sympathetic to la-
17. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 23.
18. Pub. L. No. 89, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943)repealedby Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
862. Similar prohibitions had been placed upon corporate contributions in 1907 by the Till-
man Act, supra note 3, and were extended by section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-506, ch. 368, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 251
(1940)), repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a) (1982)).
19. Pub. L. No. 89, ch. 144, § 9,57 Stat. 163, 167 (1943)repealedby Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
§§ 21, 38, 62 Stat. 862.
20. Pub. L. No. 101, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C.




23. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1971)), as
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93
Stat. 1339 (1980) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1982)).
24. The CIO was an association of industrial labor unions active from 1938 until 1955, when it
merged with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). See also discussion of AFL, infra
note 35.




29. See OVERACKER, PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FUNDS 57-59 (1946).
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bor's causes. 30 Although the relationship between the CIO and its
PAC's was close, the union carefully ensured that its PAC's were tech-
nically separate from the union itself.3' CIO officers did not serve as
directors of PAC's; PAC treasuries were separated from union ac-
counts; and contributions were used to offset the administrative costs of
PAC's.32 The -CIO contended that, as independent entities supported
by voluntary contributions, its PAC's were not subject to the restric-
tions of the Smith-Connelly Act, which focused on the use of union
treasury funds to support federal political campaigns. 33
Other unions followed the CIO-PAC example and established their
own separate, segregated funds to foster political activity. 34  In 1947,
the American Federation of Labor (AFL)35 created its Labor League. 36
In 1955, when the AFL and the CIO merged, their PAC's joined to-
gether as the Committee on Political Education (COPE).3 7 COPE
quickly became the major source of political donations from organized
labor, although several other labor organizations were also involved in
political activity. In 1956, seventeen national labor political action
committees were active, and 155 state or local union affiliates had their
own committees. 38 By 1968, the number of national labor political ac-
tion committees had risen to thirty-seven.39
Although prohibitions against corporate political contributions ex-
isted thirty-six years before such prohibitions applied to labor organi-
zations,4 ° corporations lagged behind unions in using separate,
segregated funds as vehicles to contribute to federal political cam-
paigns. Rather, corporations used alternative methods to affect the
political process. Contributions previously made by the corporation
were now made by individual corporate officials and their families.4 '
Political contributions were also laundered through trade associations,
public relations firms, corporate attorneys, and other close corporate
ties.42 In addition, corporations frequently gave candidates in kind
contributions, including the use of office space, equipment, and
30. Id
31. Id. at 59.
32. Id. at 60-61.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The AFL was an association of industrial labor unions founded in 1881 as the "Federation of
Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada," and reorganized in
1886 as the AFL. The AFL as a separate entity was dissolved in 1955 when it merged with
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), to form a new labor federation, the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).
36. See OVERACKER, supra note 29, at 57-58.
37. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 24.
38. Id at 25.
39. Id. In 1956, the seventeen national labor PAC's disbursed some $2.1 million. In 1968, how-
ever, the thirty-seven national labor PAC's disbursed over three times that amount, $7.1
million. Id.
40. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
41. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 25.




The American Medical Political Action Committee (AMPAC),
founded in 1961 by the American Medical Association, was the first
major PAC in the business and professional sector. 44 It was followed in
August, 1963, by the Business-Industry Political Action Committee
(BIPAC), established by the National Association of Manufacturers.45
However, it was not until Congress approved the use of separate, segre-
gated funds as a proper method of corporate contributions that corpo-
rations became significantly involved with PAC's.
4 6
Ppeftters Local Union No. 562 v. United States
Despite the proliferation of separate, segregated PAC funds among
labor organizations and corporations, the use of such funds remained
controversial. Many of the questions regarding their legality were
raised in Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States,47 argued
before the United States Supreme Court in January, 1972. The Pipefit-
ters case involved a government challenge to the propriety of a sepa-
rate union fund maintained for political purposes a.4  Although the fund
at issue was supported from 1963 through 1968 by union member do-
nations, the government challenged the true voluntariness of the dona-
tions because they had been solicited at job sites.4 9 Of greater
importance, the Justice Department questioned the administrative
structure of the union's political action committee. Under the PAC's
then-existing structure, its activities were closely administered by the
union, whose officers served as PAC directors and made decisions re-
garding the disposition of PAC funds.5 In addition, the PAC's operat-
ing expenses were paid in part from union dues.5 The government
contended that the close connection between the union and the PAC
was impermissible, arguing that the PAC functioned as the alter ego of
the union and thereby fell within the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 610
(formerly section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act). 2 The government fur-
ther argued that the payment of PAC administrative costs through
union dues was an indirect use of dues for political purposes and there-
fore unlawful.53
While the Pipefitters case was still pending, Congress passed the
43. Id at 32.
44. Id.
45. Id at 32-33.
46. During the 1964 elections, BIPAC spent $203,283 and AMPAC spent $405,052 (as compared
with the $988,810 spent that year by COPE). In 1968, BIPAC and AMPAC together spent
only $5,300 less than COPE. Furthermore, while there were only 33 business and profes-
sional political action committees registered in 1968, by 1972 there were 200 such commit-
tees. See Epstein, An Irony of Electoral Reform, 3 REG. 35 (1979).
47. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
48. Id. at 388.
49. Id. at 392.
50. Id at 388-94.
51. Id at 393.
52. Id. at 413. See also supra notes 21, 24, and accompanying text.
53. Id. at 389-90.
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Federal Election Campaign Act of 197 1, 4 a law aimed principally at
reducing the amount of money spent in federal election campaigns and
eliminating campaign abuses through contribution disclosure. As the
legislation" was being considered in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, an amendment, sponsored by Representative Orvall Hansen (R-
Idaho), was added to clarify permissible union and corporate political
activities. 6 This amendment permitted the use of union and corporate
funds for voter education programs, get-out-the-vote drives, and signif-
icantly, for the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contri-
butions for separate, segregated funds.57 Moreover, specific language
was included to ensure that contributions made to such funds would be
truly voluntary.58 Representative Hansen viewed the voluntariness re-
quirement as removing such contributions from the Taft-Hartley Act's
proscription.59
Although no one challenged Representative Hansen's characteriza-
tion of separate, segregated funds as permissible under the Taft-Hart-
ley Act, it appears that the amendment was suggested by labor
organizations, anxious to obtain approval of the fundraising device
under attack before the Supreme Court in the Pipeftters case.6 °
Congressional approval of the Hansen amendment played a promi-
54. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1971)), as
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93
Stat. 1339 (1980) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1982)).
55. H.R. 11060, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 43379-81 (1971).
56. 117 CONG. REC. 43417, 43422 (1971).
57. Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, § 202, 86 Stat. 3, 10 (1972).
58. Id
59. 117 CONG. REC. 43379-81 (1971). Representative Hansen, speaking in support of his amend-
ment, indicated that it was merely a codification of the way section 610 had been interpreted
and a clarification of the existing law's ambiguity. In discussing the portion of his amend-
ment dealing with separate, segrated funds, he explained that the underlying purposes of the
Taft-Hartley restrictions were twofold: (1) to protect the political process from the aggregate
wealth of union and corporate treasuries; and (2) to ensure that shareholders and union
members were not forced to financially support political views that they did not share. Id at
43381. These purposes, he said, did not require that corporations and unions be totally ex-
cluded from political activity, but only that funds spent for political purposes come from
voluntary contributions. Id To support his position, he quoted from Senator Taft's expla-
nation of section 610 during the debate of the 1947 Act:
If [union members or stockholders] are asked to contribute directly. . . to the support
of a labor [or management] political organization, they know what their money is to
be used for and presumably approve it. From such contribution the organization can
spend all the money it wants to with respect to such matters. But the prohibition is
against labor unions using their members' dues for political purposes . . . and per-
haps in violation of the wishes of many of its stockholders.
Id (quoting 93 CONG. REC. 6440 (1947)). Since his amendment required that contributions
be voluntary, in Representative Hansen's view it did not violate the spirit of the Taft-Hartley
Act.
Interestingly, members of the House did not appear to recognize the significance of this
portion of the Hansen amendment. Concerned about the ability of organized labor to mobil-
ize voters, opponents spoke against the provisions allowing unions to operate voter education
and get-out-the-vote drives. Id at 43383-43386. No opposition, however, was expressed to
the provision giving unions and corporations access to the political process through the use
of separate segregated funds. Id at 43379-91.
60. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 38-39; Epstein, An Irony ofElectoral
Reform, 3 REG. 35 (1979).
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nent part in the Supreme Court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 610.61
While acknowledging that passage of the FECA of 1971 did not con-
clusively establish congressional intent in passing the 1947 Act (which
was binding in this case), the Court felt that it could "throw a cross
light" on the earlier act.62 After reviewing the Taft-Hartley Act's legis-
lative history, the Court concluded that Congress' intent was to allow
unions and corporations a voice in the political process through sepa-
rate, segregated funds, as long as the funds were supported through
voluntary contributions.63 In addition, the Court found that Congress'
failure in the 1947 Act to specifically require a PAC's functional inde-
pendence from union control permitted union dominance over the op-
eration of its political fund.' The Court confirmed its interpretation of
the Taft-Hartley Act by referring to the Hansen amendment's express
language and the accompanying House debates.65
Thus, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Supreme
Court's decision in Pipqfitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States ex-
pressly recognized political action committees as a vehicle for union
and corporate campaign contributions in federal elections, and the
1970's proved to be a time of burgeoning growth for the newly-ap-
proved political device.66
While Congress did not foresee the prominent role PAC's would
later play in federal elections, Justice Powell's dissent in the Piqvfitters
case forewarned of the potential influence of political action
committees:
The opinion of the Court provides a blueprint for compliance with
§ 610, as now construed, which will be welcomed by every corporation
and union which wishes to take advantage of a heretofore unrecog-
nized opportunity to influence elections in this country ....
[It] goes a long way toward returning unions and corporations
to an unregulated status with respect to political contributions. This
opening of the door to extensive corporate and union influence on the
61. The Court held that "§ 610 does not apply to union contributions and expenditures from
political funds financed in some sense by the voluntary donations of employees." 407 U.S. at
409. The Court confirmed its conclusion by noting Congress' approval of the Hansen
amendment. Id at 410.
62. 407 U.S. at 412.
63. Id at 409.
64. Id at 414-15.
65. Id at 410-12, 422-27. Although the Hansen amendment had been presented as a codification
of existing law, the Court found that on one point the law had at least arguably been
changed. The Court found some support in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act for
the government's argument that the administrative costs of political action committees could
not be covered from union dues but must be paid for by voluntary contributions. Id. at 429.
The Hansen amendment expressly permitted union funds to be used for such expenses. The
Court concluded that the 1947 Act governed in this situation, id at 433, but because this
particular issue was not essential for a resolution of the case, the Court did not reach a final
conclusion as to whether the union's financial support of its PAC had been improper. Id at
440.
66. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 55-56.
67. 407 U.S. at 448-49.
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elective and legislative processes must be viewed with genuine concern.
This seems to me to be a regressive step as contrasted with the numer-
ous legislative and judicial actions in recent years designed to assure
that elections are indeed free and representative.68
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA
of 1974)69 were enacted in the wake of campaign abuses revealed dur-
ing the Watergate scandal.7" In an effort to limit the influence of spe-
cial interest groups and large contributors, limitations were imposed on
campaign contributions and independent expenditures.7' In addition,
the Act provided public financing for Presidential elections and created
the Federal Election Commission to ensure compliance with the new
law.72 Ironically, the Act encouraged PAC development and strength-
ened their role in the electoral process. Two provisions led to this
result.
First, the Act authorized the establishment of separate, segregated
funds by government contractors.73 Prior to 1971, government contrac-
tors were prohibited from contributing directly to political cam-
paigns.74 The FECA of 1971 extended that ban to include indirect
contributions.75 Because PAC contributions could be viewed as ema-
nating indirectly from a company's corporate treasury, many govern-
ment contractors were hesitant about forming PAC's. 76 However, the
1974 Act made it clear that Congress had not intended to preclude gov-
ernment contractors from utilizing this political tool. 7 7
Second, section 101(a) of the Act imposed a $5,000 ceiling on cam-
paign contributions made by political committees to a federal election
candidate.78 Contributions by all other individuals and organizations
68. Id at 448-50.
69. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455, 5
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1503, 18 U.S.C. §§ 591,608, 611,613-617, 26 U.S.C. §§ 276, 6012, 9002-9012,
9031-9042, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976 & Supp. 1981)).
70. See 120 CONG. REc. 8465 (1974), in which Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., R-Md., ex-
pressed his regret that this legislation was necessary in part because of "the sordid realities of
the Watergate experience which has so shaken the confidence of Americans in their political
institution and leaders."
71. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 103, 88 Stat. 1263, 1272 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)).
72. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 201, 88 Stat. 1272-75 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982)).
73. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 103, 88 Stat. 1263, 1272 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441c(b) (1982)).
74. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 683, 723-24 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610), amended
by Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 10, 63 Stat. 89, 90; Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 20(c), 65
Stat. 718.
75. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 1, 10 (1972).
76. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 42.
77. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)
(1982)).
78. For purposes of the contribution limitation, a political committee was defined as a committee
registered with the Federal Election Commission for at least six months, receiving contribu-
tions from more than fifty people, and making contributions to five or more federal candi-




were limited to $1,000 per election.7 9 In addition, an annual aggregate
campaign contribution ceiling of $25,000 was placed upon those cov-
ered by the $1,000 limitation.80
Although the $5,000 ceiling was in accord with the Act's purpose,
the distinction drawn between political committees and individuals
greatly strengthened the role of political action committees in the elec-
toral process by making them a more convenient source of funding for
candidates. The FECA of 1974 allowed committees to donate five
times more than individuals, thereby making any single PAC a poten-
tially more substantial contributor than any one individual. In addi-
tion, Congress' failure to impose an annual aggregate limit on PAC
contributions allowed political action committees to exert more influ-
ence in elections. While a wealthy individual could not make political
contributions in excess of $25,000, a PAC could continue to do so as
long as it had money.
The basis for the distinction which Congress made between individ-
uals and PAC's was logically a simple one. Because PAC's represent a
large number of contributors, they should be allowed to contribute
more than individuals.8 While Senate bill 3044 (S. 3044) (the Senate
precursor of the FECA of 1974)82 originally placed the same limit on
all contributions without regard to source, an amendment was added to
the bill which raised the ceiling on political committee contributions to
$6,000.83 Debate on the Hathaway amendment is illustrative of the va-
rying views taken of political action committees. 84
Proponents of the amendment focused debate on PAC's which have
an ideological character. 85  They argued that PAC's are a valuable
political tool because they allow individuals who otherwise could af-
ford to contribute only a few dollars to participate more significantly in
affecting federal elections.8 6  In their view, limiting contributions by
79. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(1)(A) (1982)).
80. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(b)(3), 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(3) (1982)).
81. 120 CONG. REC. 8770, 8776-79 (1974).
82. S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 3707 (1974). Senate bill 3044 was originally
introduced in the Senate by Senator Howard W. Cannon, D-Nev. Id Senator Howard M.
Metzenbaum, D-Ohio, was later added as a co-sponsor. The bill was the subject of much
debate during this session of Congress, and a number of reports were prepared, including: S.
REP. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1237, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
and H.R. REP. No. 93-1438, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
83. 120 CONG. REC. 8776 (1974). This amendment, number 1082, proposed by Senator William
D. Hathaway, D-Me., was debated, id at 8776-79, and agreed upon. Id. at 8779.
84. Id. at 8776-79 (1974).
85. Id. During their debate, the Senators discussed the effect of the Hathaway amendment on
the National Committee for an Effective Congress, the American Conservative Union, the
Americans for Conservative Action, and the Right to Work Organization. Id. at 8776-77.
86. Id For example, Senator Walter D. Huddleston, D-Ky., stated that the Hathaway amend-
ment, "would be a contribution to those who like to participate and like to know their views
are being felt by joining an organization, knowing that the organization might have some
impact . . . on the outcome of a race in which they are interested because they support a
candidate." Id at 8779.
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these organizations would promote the dominance of the electoral pro-
cess by the wealthy. 7
Opponents of the Hathaway amendment focused on the influence
wielded by the large political action committees of unions and corpora-
tions."8 They argued that the amendment was contrary to the basic
goal of the legislation, which was to limit the role of wealthy special
interests-whether individuals or organizations-in the political pro-
cess. Opponents argued that the bill should be drafted so as to en-
courage individual participation in elections and they feared that such
involvement would be discouraged if PAC's were allowed to make
greater contributions.8 9 Furthermore, they argued that such organiza-
tions were not a necessary element of our electoral system.9"
In response to the argument that political action committees repre-
sented the interest of small contributors, Senator Robert Griffin (R-
Mich.), an outspoken opponent of the Hathaway amendment, re-
minded the Senate that people, not organizations, are represented in
Congress. 9' Senator Griffin believed that by contributing to a political
organization rather than to a candidate or political party, a person had,
in a sense, "delegated an important element of his own citizenship re-
sponsibility." 92 Senator Griffin argued strongly that the national inter-
est would be endangered by allowing organizations to contribute more
than individuals.93
Senator Griffin's concerns were echoed by Senator Howard Baker
(R-Tenn.) when Senator Baker introduced an amendment prohibiting
all organizations except political parties from making campaign contri-
butions.94 While Senator Baker supported the amendment's efforts to
limit such contributions, he believed that more expansive legislation
was needed.95 Senator Baker was convinced that the most effective
means of eliminating what he termed the "distortive influence of spe-
cial interests" would be a complete ban on group contributions. 96 Not
87. Id at 8776-80.
88. See, e.g., id at 8777, in which Senator Robert Griffin, R-Mich., refers to "special interest
groups---organizations that collect and distribute campaign money for business, labor, farm
and other special interest groups-including the infamous milk funds ...."
89. Id. at 8777-78. Senator Griffin maintained that "the basic question is ... whether the citi-
zenship responsibility should be delegated by individual citizens to special interest groups."
Id at 8778.
90. Id at 8777-78.
91. See id. at 8777. Senator Griffin reemphasized an earlier point that "special interest groups
do not vote; people vote."
92. Id. at 8777-78.
93. Id at 8777.
94. 120 CONG. REC. 9551-52 (1974). Senator Baker's amendment, number 1126, read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 615 and 616, no person other than an indi-
vidual may make a contribution. Violation of the provisions of this section is punish-




96. Id. Senator Baker stated that he could "conceive of no more effective way to eliminate the
distortive influence of special interests than by banning group contributions altogether." Id
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surprisingly, given the Senate's earlier approval of the Hathaway
amendment, the Senate refused to ban PAC contributions entirely.97
Some House members shared the objections to political action com-
mittees raised in the Senate.9 House bill 16090, 99 reported by the
House Administration Committee, contained the $1,000/$5,000 limita-
tion included in the final version of the Senate bill, S. 3044.1"0 A
number of minority members of the committee expressed vigorous op-
position to the distinction in the committee report:
If campaign contributions have ever been used for leverage in the
political system, then surely the political action funds of special interest
groups top the list for influencing political officials. If we are truly to
reform the political system, then special interest campaign money
should be outlawed.' 0 r
However, House members generally did not share this negative
view of political action committees. One amendment prohibiting orga-
nizations from making political contributions was defeated in the
House Administration Committee;10 2 another amendment reducing the
ceiling from $5,000 to $2,500 was defeated by the full House. 103
The SUN-PAC Advisory Opinion
Following enactment of the FECA of 1974, the newly-created Fed-
eral Election Commission issued an advisory opinion dramatically in-
creasing corporate interest in political action committees.t' 4 The Sun
Oil Company requested permission from the FEC to expend funds to
solicit employee and stockholder contributions for its political action
committee, SUN-PAC.' 015 In Advisory Opinion 1975-23, issued De-
cember 3, 1975, the FEC approved Sun Oil's request."° The opinion
established several precedents which encouraged corporate PAC devel-
opment. First, the decision permitted solicitation by Sun Oil of contri-
butions from employees as well as stockholders. 07 The FECA of 1971
had permitted solicitation by corporations only of their shareholders. 0 8
Second, the opinion permitted Sun Oil to solicit contributions through
97. Id at 9555. The Senate voted against Senator Baker's amendment by a margin of 53 to 36.
98. See generall, 120 CONG. REC. 27220-66 (1974), for an account of the House debate on H.R.
16090, which was the House version of the FECA of 1974.
99. H.R. 16090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 25038 (1974).
100. 120 CONG. REc. at 27221, 27242. "Contributions by a person to a candidate for Federal
office would be limited to $1,000 per election applied separately to primary and general
elections. Contributions by multi-candidate committees would be limited to $5,000 per elec-
tion." Id at 27242.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1974).
102. Id
103. 120 CONG. REC. 27259-60 (1974).
104. Sun Oil Company, Inc., Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 1975-23, 40 Fed.
Reg. 56584 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinion]. See also PAC's EVOLUTION AND
GROWTH, supra note 9, at 45-46.
105. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 104, at 56584.
106. Id




a payroll deduction plan. 0 9 Labor unions had previously been prohib-
ited from using this fundraising device by the Taft-Hartley Act." 0
Last, the opinion authorized the establishment of multiple political
funds with separate contribution limits."'
As a result of the SUN-PAC decision, corporations rushed to form
political action committees. In the thirteen months following the SUN-
PAC decision, the number of corporate PAC's almost tripled."I2 The
number of registered PAC's overall increased from 722 to 1,146, an
increase of almost sixty percent."
t3
Buckley v. Vaieo
On November 30, 1976, the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Buckley v. Valeo. t14 The Court held that the expenditure ceil-
ings of the FECA of 1974 were unconstitutional because they imposed
"substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens,
and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions
that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.""' In doing so, the Court
invalidated one of the central reforms around which the FECA of 1974
had been structured." 6 Specifically, the Court held that the limitation
on independent expenditures (expenditures made in support of or in
opposition to a candidate without the approval of the candidate or his
campaign committee) was an impermissible infringement upon the
right of free speech."7 The Court's decision was premised upon its
view that political expenditures are the equivalent of speech." 18 While
the Court upheld Congress' ability to limit contributions to protect the
integrity of the representative process, it believed that elected officials
would not feel a sense of obligation to those making independent ex-
penditures. 9 Consequently, it found the limitation upon those ex-
penditures to be an unacceptable intrusion on first amendment
rights.'20 In distinguishing the limitation on contributions from in-
dependent expenditures, the Court found that the contribution limita-
109. Id
110. Pub. L. No. 101, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 610 (1947), repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, tit. II, § 201(a), 90 Stat.
496).
II. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 104, at 56585.
112. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 56. The tables presented here indi-
cate that from December 31, 1975 through December 31, 1976 the number of corporate
PAC's increased from 139 to 433.
113. Id at 56-57.
114. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
115. Id at 58-59.
116. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
117. Id at 47-49.
118. Id at 39. The Court stated that "'ilt is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limita-
tions is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates."
Id See also Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001,
1005 (1976).
119. 424 U.S. at 72. See also Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendmen!
an Obstacle to Political Equality? 82 COLuM. L. REV. 609, 625-31 (1982).
120. 424 U.S. at 39-51.
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tion did not present as great a bar to political expression because of the
numerous alternatives for political giving. 2 ' Significantly, the Court
alluded to political action committees as one alternative.122
The effect of the Court's decision on independent expenditures is to
allow political organizations which desire to make contributions in ex-
cess of the FECA restrictions to do so. Statistics indicate that PAC's
have generally been hesitant in making independent expenditures, per-
haps because candidates have not welcomed such efforts on their be-
half' 23 Nevertheless, some of the ideological PAC's that have emerged
in recent years have made significant independent expenditures. 24 It is
uncertain, however, how popular this campaign tool will become in fu-
ture elections.
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo forced Congress
to reconsider the issue of election reform again in 1975. In addition to
invalidating the expenditure ceilings of the 1974 Act, the Supreme
Court held in Buckley that the structure of the Federal Election Com-
mission, which then consisted of congressional appointees, violated the
doctrine of separation of powers 125 and the appointments clause 126 of
the United States Constitution. The Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976 (FECA of 1976)127 was an attempt to restructure
the Commission and redraft the 1974 Act before the 1976 Presidential
election. 128
The 1976 Act was primarily a response to the SUN-PAC and Buck-
ley opinions and emphasized restoring the balance between union and
corporate PAC's. By 1976, PAC's were firmly established as a means
of political activity.'29 Although one unsuccessful effort was again
made in the Senate to ban group contributions entirely, 130 congres-
sional debate no longer focused on the relative merits of individual and
121. Id at 22-35.
122. Id at 35. Specifically, the Court stated that "Section 608(b)(2) permits certain committees,
designated as 'political committees,' to contribute up to $5000 to any candidate with respect
to any election for federal office." Id
123. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 180. In 1980, about $14 million was
spent independently by PAC's, which amounts to about 12% of all PAC spending in that
year. Id
124. Id
125. 424 U.S. at 143. The Court discussed the application of the separation of power doctrine in
Buckley at 120-24.
126. Id at 143. The Court discussed the application of the appointments clause in Buckley at
124-37.
127. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
128. See Court Decision Forces New Campaign Law, CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 459 (1976).
129. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 74, 77, and 78. In 1976, PAC contri-
butions to congressional candidates in the general election amounted to $20.5 million, which
represented almost 20% of all contributions given to those candidates in that year. d at 74.
130. In 1976, Senator Chiles introduced an amendment during consideration of Senate bill 3065.
It was not accepted by his colleagues. See 122 CoNG. REc. 7181, 7189 (1976).
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group participation in the political process as it had in 1974.131
The 1976 Act contained numerous reforms which directly effected
the operation and development of PAC's. First, campaign finance laws
were recodified by moving the relevant sections of Title 18 of the
United States Code to Title 2.132 Section 610,13' dealing with corporate
and union contributors, became section 44 l b; '34 section 611,135 dealing
with government contractor contributions, became section 441 c. 1
36
Organizations which had been designated as political committees in
the 1974 Act were called "multi-candidate political committees" in the
new Act, 13 7 and limitations were imposed upon contributions to na-
tional political parties and political committees. 131 Multi-candidate
political committees were permitted to contribute $5,000 to a candidate
or his campaign committee;139 $15,000 to a national party commit-
tee; 140 and $5,000 to other political committees. 14 1 Individuals and
political committees not meeting the definition of a multi-candidate
political committee were limited to contributing $1,000 to candidates
and their campaign committees; 14 2 $20,000 to national parties; 143 and
$5,000 to other political committees.' 44 Individuals remained the only
group subject to the $25,000 aggregate ceiling."'
In response to labor opposition to the FEC's advisory opinion on
SUN-PAC, 146 Congress prohibited corporations from making more
than two written solicitations for political contributions from employ-
ees. 1 7 More specifically, Congress allowed corporate PAC's to solicit
contributions only from the corporation's stockholders, executive per-
sonnel, and their families. 14  Labor organizations were restricted to
soliciting contributions from members and their families. 149 However,
the 1976 Act did provide that twice each year, business and labor com-
mittees could solicit from each other's pool.
150
In addition, the Act permitted labor organizations to use the same
131. See 122 CONG. REC. 7182, 7189 (1976).
132. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1982).
133. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 723 (originally codified at 2 U.S.C. § 610 (1976)),
repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, tit. II, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496.
134. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
135. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 724 (originally codified at 2 U.S.C. § 611 (1976))
repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, tit. II, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496.
136. 2 U.S.C. § 441c (1982).
137. Id § 441a(a)(2) (1982).
138. Id
139. Id § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1982).
140. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(B) (1982).
141. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(C) (1982).
142. Id. § 441a(a)(I)(A) (1982).
143. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(B) (1982).
144. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1982).
145. Id § 441a(a)(3) (1982).
146. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 104, at 56584-88.
147. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A) (1982).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1982).
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fundraising techniques available to corporations and required corpora-
tions to make such systems available to unions at cost. 51 Thus, payroll
deductions were made available to unions and businesses alike.' 52 Ac-
quisition of this convenient fundraising technique was viewed by labor
organizations as a great benefit.
The FECA of 1976 provided a further incentive for PAC develop-
ment by expressly authorizing the establishment of separate, segregated
funds by trade associations, membership organizations, and other
groups. 53 However, at the same time, Congress significantly restricted
PAC development by prohibiting the establishment of multiple PAC's
within a single organization. The antiproliferation section provided
that multiple PAC's established by corporations or labor unions
through subsidiaries, branches, departments, or local units would be
treated as a single, separate, segregated fund under federal election
law. 154
Lastly, the 1976 Act addressed the problem of independent expend-
itures. Although Buckley clearly prevented Congress from restricting
such expenditures, Congress tightened the definition of independent
expenditure in the 1976 Act to prevent any collusion between those
parties making independent expenditures and the candidate.' 55 The
Act defined independent expenditure as:
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate which is made without cooperation or
consultation with any candidate or any authorized committee or agent
of such candidate and which is not made in concert with, or at the
request or suggestion of, any candidate or any authorized committee or
agent of the candidate. 156
In addition, the Act required that all independent expenditures exceed-
ing $100 of currency be reported to the Federal Election Commission
and that a statement be filed affirming that the expenditure was not
made in collusion with the candidate.'57 The $100 threshold require-
ment was later increased to $250.158
IMPACT OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
Although the exact impact that PAC money has had on the legisla-
tive process is indeterminable, the degree of influence clearly is sub-
stantial and growing. If by no other measure, the substantial media
151. Id § 441b(b)(4)-(b)(6) (1982).
152. Id
153. Id § 441b(b)(4)(B)-(4)(D) (1982).
154. Id § 441a(a)(5) (1982).
155. Id § 431(17) (1982).
156. Id
157. Id § 441g (1982).
158. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 104, 93 Stat.
1339, 1354 (1980) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431).
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attention devoted to PAC's indicates a new and significant trend.' 59
Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.) underscored the basic rational
of PAC's, observing that: "PAC money is not free; it has strings at-
tached.""'6  These strings are pulled and votes are delivered. While
certainly no member of Congress would link a vote on a particular
matter to a political contribution, commentators have observed that the
massive amount of money pumped into recent campaigns has impacted
significantly on the political process.' 6 ' Brooks Jackson, a political
commentator, illustrated the effect:
Associated Milk Producers, Inc. [AMPI], a dairy-farmer cooperative
with just 33,000 members, controls one of the richest of all PACs.
AMPI gave $1.1 million this election and then issued a news release
saying 92% of the candidates it backed were elected. "The great major-
ity of U.S. congressional districts have no significant milk production,"
AMPI said. But "dairy farmers have proved that they can have sub-
stantial impact nationwide on the decision-making process."'
162
PAC's often function collectively, with one interest group sponsor-
ing several PAC's. Frequently, only a particular piece of legislation or
vote is the PAC's priority goal. 163 Tens of thousands of dollars may go
to one member of Congress who knows only too well the groups'
aims.' 6" Most importantly, PAC's frequently effect their desired re-
sult. 165  Political commentator Elizabeth Drew has concluded that
"[t]he processes by which Congress is supposed to function have been
distorted if not overwhelmed by the role of money."''
66
Less clear but equally troubling is the effect of the flood of dollars
on individual participation in the political process. In one sense, PAC's
are based on the belief that people should participate in the political
process as a group and not as individuals. Succinctly, the expanding
influence of PAC's effectively threatens to lock individual citizens out
of the political process. Some fear that the very notion of representa-
tive democracy, that one person's vote equals the next person's vote, is
challenged by a system fostering financial contributions and resultant
political influence.' 67  The nation's path toward achieving the "one
159. See generally Isaacson, Running with the PA Cs, TIME, Oct. 25, 1982, at 20; Drew, Politics and
Money, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 1982, at 54; Dec. 13, 1982, at 57; Clymer, Will Congress
Pass the Buck on Campaign Financing?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, at E3, col. 4, Miller, The
Pernicious Influence of PACs on Congress, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1983, at 30, col. 3, Wright, Big
Bucks in Politics- Sin Against the Constitution, Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1982, at Cl, col. 1; and
PAC Politics, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 8, 1982, at 24, col. 1.
160. Campaign Finance Reform Proposals of 1983." Hearings on The Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, As Amended and on Various Measures to Amend the Act Before the Senate Comm.
on Rules andAdmit., 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1983) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire, D-
Wis.) [hereinafter cited as Campaign Finance Hearings].
161. See Jackson, The Problem with PACs, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1982, at 30, col. 4.
162. Id
163. See Drew, supra note 159, Dec. 6, 1982, at 131.
164. Id.
165. Id at 54.
166. Id
167. See PAC Politics, supra note 159, at 24, col. I.
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man, one vote" ideal has been long and difficult. A political process
dominated by PAC's may well negate that ideal.
Judge J. Skelly Wright of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Circuit of the District of Columbia has been a leading voice in
sounding the alarm. Judge Wright points to those individuals whose
voices are drowned out by money's polluting effect on election cam-
paigns. 6 ' Judge Wright urges government regulation of the influence
of money, "so that the wealthiest voices may not dominate the debate
by the strength of their dollars rather than their ideas."' 69
PAC's wealthy voices are indeed beginning to dominate. Elizabeth
Drew warns what is at stake:
The public knows that something is wrong. As the public cynicism gets
deeper, the political system gets worse. Until the problem of money is
dealt with, the system will not get better. We have allowed the basic
idea of our democratic process-representative government-to slip
away. The only question is whether we are serious about trying to
retrieve it. 70
From their inception, PAC's have faced opposition. However, the
1982 elections raised new alarms over money's role. There is growing
disquiet among Senators and Representatives regarding the unceasing
quest for campaign funds and the role of PAC's in meeting that de-
mand.' 7 ' The impact on the legislative process is clearly recognized.
In the cloakrooms there is worry about the quidpro quo often implied
in PAC contributions when specific votes or detailed questionnaires re-
garding legislative stances are prerequisites of support. Certainly, in-
fluence-buying is not new to Congress. However, many people feel
that Congress and the courts have facilitated and legitimized political
influence-buying by PAC's. 1
7 2
In January, 1983, the Senate Rules Committee opened hearings on
the subject of campaign finance. 17 3 These hearings highlighted some of
the more important concerns. Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)
stated his view that:
[T]he current system of financing congressional elections is a national
scandal. It virtually forces Members of Congress to go around hat in
hand, begging for money from Washington-based special interest
groups, political action committees whose sole purpose for existing is
to seek a quid pro quo .... We see the degrading spectacle of elected
representatives completing detailed questionnaires on their positions
on special interest issues, knowing that the monetary reward of PAC
support depends on the correct answers.' 74
168. See Wright, supra note 159, at CI, col. 1.
169. Wright, supra note 119, at 638.
170. Drew, supra note 159, Dec. 13, 1982, at 111.
171. See Drew, supra note 159, Dec. 6, 1982, at 55.
172. Id at 60.
173. See Campaign Finance Hearings, supra note 160.
174. Id at 49 (statement of Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton, D-Mo.).
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Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), pointing to the increasing
dominance of PAC's, noted, "I do object to the steady, relentless, elec-
tion-after-election increase in both the volume of PAC special interest
contributions, and the proportion they represent of all contribu-
tions. . . . [T]he public interest is losing out."' 75
In addition, Senate Rules Committee Chairman Charles McC. Ma-
thias (R-Md.) raised the issue of public confidence in the Congress,
stating:
Almost as bad as the potential for inequity and corruption in the cur-
rent system of campaign finance is the general perception of undue
influence. The latest Harris poll shows that 84 percent of Americans
...believe that "those who contribute large sums of money have too
much influence over the government." Now, I have no doubt that this
cynicism contributes to our terrible state of voter apathy, apathy to the
extent that over half of the eligible voters do not bother to turn out for
congressional elections.
176
A survey undertaken in the spring of 1983 by the Center for Re-
sponsive Politics indicates substantial congressional dissatisfaction with
campaign financing. 177 Responses from over 140 members of Congress
clearly demonstrate a strong sentiment in favor of limiting total cam-
paign expenditures and the political influence of PAC's. 178
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES TO CURB THE INFLUENCE OF PAC'S
Since 1977, numerous bills aimed at limiting the role of PAC's in
the political process have been introduced.'79 The most successful was
175. Id at 46 (statement of Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis.).
176. Id at 3 (statement of Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., R-Md.).
177. See Fenn, supra note 8, at 30.
178. Id The Center for Responsive Politics conducted a study entitled Campaign Finance Survey
of Members of Congress. Its findings include the following:
1) Are the current campaign laws basically satisfactory or do they need to be
changed?
21% satisfactory 76% change needed 3% no opinion
2) What is your view of enhancing the influence of political parties by increasing the
amount they can contribute to House and Senate races?
66% favor 28% oppose 6% no opinion
3) What is your view of attempts to limit total PAC contributions to candidates?
66% favor 31% oppose 3% no opinioin
4) What is your view of attempts to set a cap on campaign expenditures?
59% favor 39% oppose 3% no opinion
5) What is your view of raising the limits on what individuals can give to
candidates?
58% favor 36% oppose 6% no opinion
6) What is your view of some form of federal financing of congressional elections?
51% favor 43% oppose 6% no opinion
7) What is your view of attempts to provide free and equal time to candidates that
are the targets of independent expenditure campaigns?
60% favor 29% oppose 11% no opinion
179. Bills introduced since 1977 to limit the role of PAC's in the political process include the
following: in the 95th Congress, H.R. 6132, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 10833
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introduced in the House as an amendment to Senate bill 832,180 the
FEC authorization bill of 1979. The amendment, known as the Obey-
Railsback amendment, 81 would have combined the primary and gen-
eral election contribution ceilings and limited PAC contributions to
$6,000 per candidate. It would also have placed a ceiling of $70,000 on
the amount that a candidate could accept from multi-candidate com-
mittees.1 2 While the House of Representatives adopted the amend-
ment, it was not considered by the Senate because of a threatened
filibuster. 83 Consequently, it did not become law.
Proposed legislation to limit PAC's can be divided into four major
categories: (1) bills seeking to reduce the influence of individual
PAC's; (2) bills seeking to reduce candidate dependence on PAC's;
(3) bills seeking to increase the influence of political parties and indi-
viduals; and (4) bills seeking public financing of all federal elections. 84
Bills which would limit the influence of individual PAC's would do
so by reducing the amount of allowable PAC contributions to individ-
ual candidates, or by banning PAC contributions entirely. 85 However,
the Buckley decision calls attention to the constitutional problems with
this approach.
In Buckley, 186 the Supreme Court upheld contribution limitations
but indicated that severe contribution restrictions would be problem-
atic: "Given the important role of contributions in financing political
campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on
political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political
committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective
(1977); H.R. 7005, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 13980 (1977); H.R. 7585, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 17359 (1977); H.R. 7966, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.
REc. 20320 (1977); H.R. 8092, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 21429 (1977); and H.R.
11315, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 5732 (1978); in the 96th Congress, S. 714, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 5697 (1979); H.R. 4768, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REc. 18392 (1979); H.R. 5081, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 22228 (1979); S. 1700,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 22632 (1979); and H.R. 4970, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. 20980 (1979) (this bill was the Campaign Contributions Reform Act of 1979,
also known as the Obey-Railsback amendment); in the 97th Congress, S. 9, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REC. SI0 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981); H.R. 9070, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127
CONG. REC. H41 11 (daily ed. July 8, 1981); H.R. 5450, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC.
H200 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1982); and H.R. 6047, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H 1405
(daily ed. April 1, 1982).
180. S. 832, 96th Cong., ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 28,644 (1979).
181. H.R. 4970, supra note 179.
182. The Obey-Railsback amendment as introduced set contribution limitations of $5,000 on the
amount that a PAC could contribute to a candidate and $50,000 on the amount that a candi-
date could accept from a PAC. 125 CONG. REC. 28,644 (1979). Representative Thompson
(D-N.J.) introduced an amendment raising those limitations to $6,000 and $70,000, respec-
tively. Id at 28,645. The Thompson amendment was adopted. Id. at 28,652. The Obey-
Railsback amendment, as amended by Representative Thompson, was adopted by the full
House. Id at 28,659.
183. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 195.
184. Id. at 195, 196.
185. See H.R. 640, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H95 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1983); H.R. 4157,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H8378 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983).




Since enactment of the 1974 limitations, inflation has reduced the
significance of a $5,000 contribution. Therefore, any reduction of that
ceiling might conflict with the Court's warning. Certainly, a total ban
on PAC contributions would evoke a constitutional challenge. 88
Critics of legislation which would lower the contribution ceiling
have also noted that increased contribution restrictions might provide a
catalyst for more independent expenditures, 89 thereby compounding
further the current difficulties with campaigns for federal office. 190
Several bills have been introduced to reduce candidate dependence
on PAC's by imposing a ceiling on the aggregate amount a candidate
may accept from PAC's during an election. 191 It has been suggested
that here, too, Buckley raises a constitutional question. 92 In Buckley,
the Supreme Court upheld the ceiling on the amount an individual
source could contribute, recognizing the potentially corrosive influence
of large contributions. 93 The Court held that Congress' imposition of
contribution limitations for the purpose of avoiding the possibility or
appearance of impropriety was justified. 194 A ceiling on the total
amount a candidate could accept from PAC's would not further this
end beyond current law for it would not affect the size of contributions.
In addition, the limitation might be viewed as limiting a candidate's
campaign coffers and thus limiting campaign expenditures, a policy
which the Supreme Court specifically disallowed in Buckley. 95
A second constitutional question might arise after a candidate had
reached the ceiling, since he could accept no additional PAC contribu-
tions. Individual PAC members' first amendment association rights
might potentially be usurped.196 Opponents argue that from a practical
standpoint such reform would aid incumbents by inhibiting challengers
from raising the money necessary to conduct a successful campaign. 97
The third method suggested for reducing the influence of PAC's is
to increase and strengthen the role of individuals and political par-
ties. 198 Legislation has been introduced that would increase the
187. Id at 21.
188. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 198.
189. Id. at 54.
190. Id at 55-56.
191. S. 2283, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S 1225 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1984); S. 1433, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S7924 (daily ed. June 8, 1983); and H.R. 2490, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1992 (daily ed. April 12, 1983).
192. See supra notes 115, 117, 118, and accompanying text. See also Letter from John E. Nowak,
Professor of Law, University of Illinois, College of Law, to Rep. Guy Vander Jagt, R-Mich.
(reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. 26228 (1979)).
193. 424 U.S. at 26.
194. Id.
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text, and source cited therein.
196. See J. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE OBEY-RAILSBACK BILL, 125
CONG. REC. 26229 (1979).
197. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 200.
198. Id. at 202.
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amount that individuals could donate to federal election campaigns. 199
Bills which would increase the aggregate contribution restrictions im-
posed on individuals from $25,000 to $30,000,200 $40,000,201 or
$50,000202 have also been introduced. However, such suggestions are
problematic in that the vast majority of individuals contribute less than
the current $1,000 ceiling. 0 3 Therefore, only a few wealthy contribu-
tors would likely take advantage of the higher ceiling. Because the
1974 election reforms were largely aimed at reducing the role of these
individuals in the electoral process, an increased contribution limita-
tion could undermine the benefits of the FECA of 1974. While some
increase in individual contribution restrictions could be made without
violating the purpose of the FECA, the line must be carefully drawn to
ensure that the balance is not tipped too far.
Those people seeking to encourage more individual participation
have also suggested increased tax credits for political contributions. u°
Currently, individuals can receive a fifty percent tax credit for political
contributions up to a maximum credit of fifty dollars.20 5 Commenta-
tors have suggested that small contributors be given a one hundred per-
cent credit.20 6 While these suggestions would confer greater benefits on
small contributors than increased contribution ceilings, only four per-
cent of the nation's taxpayers presently take advantage of the credit.20 7
Therefore, it is questionable whether an increased credit would en-
courage additional campaign contributions.
A tax credit for individual contributions to political parties has also
been proposed.20 8 It is thought that contributors would seek tax bene-
fits by contributing to parties rather than through PAC's. 20 9 The
strength of this suggestion lies in the fact that elected officials would
likely support legislation designed to enhance the role of political par-
ties. However, such reform would likely encounter opposition from
those individuals concerned about a candidate's ability to challenge in-
cumbents, and from those concerned about the parties' relative wealth.
The last suggestion offered to curb PAC influence is to publicly fi-
nance federal election campaigns.210 Proponents see this as the most
effective way to eliminate the role of special interest groups. They
199. See S. 732, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S2432 (daily ed. March 9, 1983).
200. S. 1185, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S5749 (daily ed. May 2, 1983).
201. S. 1851, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S13476 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1981).
202. S. 1899, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S14303 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1981).
203. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 204.
204. See H.R. 2833, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H2510 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1983); H.R.
2976, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H2859 (daily ed. May 11, 1983).
205. 26 U.S.C. §§ 41(a)-(b)(1), 218(a)-(b)(I) (1979).
206. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 206.
207. Id
208. See H.R. 3737, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H6349 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1983).
209. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 206-07.
210. See S. 85, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 591 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983); S. 151, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S93 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983); and H.R. 3812, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H6606 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983).
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point to the apparent success of publicly-funded presidential races. 21I
However, this concept is the most radical and, therefore, the most con-
troversial of the proposals. Public financing legislation has been intro-
duced without success in nearly every Congress since 1956.212
Opponents urge that campaigns should be based upon the interest and
activities of individuals, not government support.21 3 A more significant
objection raised by opponents is the potential cost of publicly-financed
federal elections.21 4
Various proposals addressing campaign finance reform have been
introduced in each of the past three Congresses.21 5 Whether the pres-
ent Congress will act affirmatively on reform legislation is uncertain.
While there has been no public outcry, the issue of campaign money is
a significant factor in the public's eroding confidence in Congress. 216
The press has been awakened to the issue and increased coverage is
likely as the tide of money advances with each election cycle. The
combination of congressional worry, media attention, and public con-
cern could provide the ingredients to prompt reform. The current cli-
mate is most aptly described as a general consensus that things are out
of hand and action must be taken.
While concerns and worries are very real and will likely continue,
campaign finance reform remains a formidable task. Reform efforts
will continue to face the obstacles of constitutional restraints, partisan
manueuvering, and the political survival instincts of every member of
Congress. Past congressional debate in this area makes clear the para-
mount concerns over which party will gain or lose from campaign re-
form and whether incumbents or challengers will receive some new
advantage.21 7
One further difficulty is the genuine lack of consensus concerning
the appropriate path for reform. No one approach has engendered
much enthusiasm, and there is a concern that anything Congress might
do may aggravate an already bad situation.
Passing corrective legislation remains possible. However, barring a
singular event such as the Watergate scandal, the impetus to spur en-
actment of a comprehensive reform package or public financing is not
on the horizon. The first session of the 98th Congress began with sig-
nificant rumblings but ended with little talk of reform. At present,
political campaigns are well underway, competition for campaign dol-
lars is fierce, and the inclination is to shelve this difficult problem until
the next Congress.
211. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 208.
212. Id at 207-08. The first bill that proposed public funding of federal elections, Senate bill
3242, was introduced in 1956. S. 3242, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 CONG. REC. 2831 (1956).
213. See PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 9, at 209.
214. Id
215. Id at 185-220.
216. Id at 165.
217. Id at 200.
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If the 98th Congress is not to pass the buck, the best approach may
lie in legislation aimed at capitalizing on the mood for reform yet rec-
ognizing the complex issues involved and the need to build a consen-
sus. At this point, Congress seems unprepared to pass public financing
legislation, to set campaign spending limits, or to prohibit PAC's en-
tirely. However, it might conceivably recognize that political action
committees represent a problem and initiate a process to address that
problem.
A MECHANISM OF REFORM
If Congress recognizes that PAC's threaten the electoral and legisla-
tive processes and that their influence should be curbed, the stage will
be set for reform. A short-term, bipartisan commission, statutorily cre-
ated and with specific tasks, could provide the mechanism to develop
concrete legislative recommendations. In essence, this approach would
be a half loaf now and a half later. Such legislation would involve two
steps. First, it would publicly record Congress' support of a limit on
the role of political action committees in financing federal elections.
Second, it would establish a commission as an instrument aimed at
fully examining the campaign finance issue and recommending the
most appropriate means for achieving Congress' goals.
Admittedly, in the legislative vernacular, authorization of a com-
mission or study is the equivalent of avoiding the issue. However, in
notable instances, commissions have proven to be useful and fruitful.
Rather than avoiding action, commissions can be the means of accom-
plishing a task that stymies normal congressional processes. The recent
experience with the National Commission on Social Security Reform
underscores the potential usefulness of this approach. 21 8 Another ex-
ample is the Commission on Federal Paperwork.2 9 Both commissions
218. The Commission on Social Security Reform made recommendations to Congress which re-
sulted in the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
Formed by President Reagan in December of 1981, the bipartisan panel of 15 congressional
and noncongressional members proposed a plan to insure short- and long-term solvency of
the Social Security system. The House bill as passed drew extensively from the Commis-
sion's recommendations. The bill sought to increase revenue in the system while reducing
growth in benefits. President Reagan signed the bill into law on April 20, 1983.
219. The Commission on Federal Paperwork, established on October 3, 1975, offered over 770
recommendations to President Carter and to the U.S. Congress to eliminate unnecessary
federal paperwork which, if adopted, would save an estimated $10 billion within one year.
As the Commission neared completion of its report, the President, the Congress, and various
government agencies had already adopted almost half of the 770 recommendations, saving
an estimated $3.5 billion. The Final Summary Report was issued on October 3, 1977. See
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL
PAPERWORK, FINAL SUMMARY REPORT (October 3, 1977). The report attributed the federal
paperwork glut to government insensitivity and poor planning. It recommended simplifying
of language used, shortening of regulations, freer flow of information, and creation of a
cabinet-level department to deal with the problem. See generally Act of Dec. 27, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-556, 88 Stat. 1789 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3512 (1976)). See also Panel




laid the groundwork for major statutory changes.220
CONCLUSION
Few issues directly and personally concern members of Congress
more than campaign finance. Difficulties always arise where the play-
ers are the ones rewriting the "rules of the game." Moreover, many
parties have a vested interest in the status quo. However, all of us have
a vested interest in the integrity of the institution. If Congress collec-
tively decides that the influence of money, through the vehicle of polit-
ical action committees, is undermining its role as the people's
representative, action should be taken. The legislation outlined above
is only a modest and initial step. But, at this juncture, it may represent
one of the few alternatives to inaction.
220. See discussion supra notes 218, 219, and accompanying text.
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